Greenbriar Condominium, Phase I (“Condominium”) initiated foreclosure proceedings against a condominium unit for the owner’s failure to pay 1995 condominium assessments and homeowner association assessments collected through the Condominium. At the foreclosure sale in May, 1996, the unit was purchased for $2,500 subject to a deed of trust in the amount of approximately $16,700. The court auditor determined the assessment debt was $3,411 at the time of the foreclosure.
The trial court ratified the sale and the owner appealed. After the appeals court reviewed the circumstances of the foreclosure sale, the trial court determined in 1998 that the purchase price was so far below fair market value that it “shocked the conscience of the court”, and invalidated the sale.
The Condominium then started a new foreclosure sale. Prior to the sale, the owner tendered payment based on the auditor’s report in the prior foreclosure by submitting a cashier’s check for $3,411 in full satisfaction of the assessment lien. The Condominium refused to accept the check and indicated that it would not accept any amount less than $31,114. This amount included the assessment debt, late fees, accrued interest and attorneys’ fees (including attorneys’ fees for the first foreclosure sale which was invalidated). Since the owner did not pay the amount demanded by the Condominium, the condominium unit was sold at the second foreclosure sale for $21,600 subject to a deed of trust in the amount of approximately $13,100.
The owner contested the sale and in July, 1999 the trial court invalidated the second foreclosure sale based upon its determination that the Condominium improperly refused to accept the owner’s tendered payment prior to the sale. The written trial court order inexplicably was not issued for over three years until September, 2002. The Condominium appealed the decision, contending that the second foreclosure was valid.
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals – the intermediate appeals court -- in September, 2004 upheld the trial court’s decision and ruled that the sale was invalid because the Condominium impermissibly denied the owner the right to stop the foreclosure by requiring the owner to pay $31,114. The court agreed that the owner properly relied on the auditor’s statement from the invalidated first sale that the amount due at the time of the 1996 foreclosure was $3,411. The intermediate appeals court also concluded that the Condominium could not legally assert a right to attorneys fees and costs from the first foreclosure sale proceeding which was never ratified by the court.
The owner contested the sale and in July, 1999 the trial court invalidated the second foreclosure sale based upon its determination that the Condominium improperly refused to accept the owner’s tendered payment prior to the sale. The written trial court order inexplicably was not issued for over three years until September, 2002. The Condominium appealed the decision, contending that the second foreclosure was valid.
However, on further appeal, the Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion in June, 2005, ruling that the unit owner did not properly exercise the right to stop a foreclosure sale and redeem the property by tendering an amount less than that claimed by the Condominium.
Rather, a debtor must offer to pay the stated outstanding debt or must file a
court motion to enjoin the sale from occurring based on a dispute over the
amount actually owed. The Court of Appeals ruled that a debtor's good faith
offer of an incorrect amount is not sufficient in invalidate a foreclosure
sale.
After the sale occurs, it can be challenged based on irregularities in the foreclosure sale procedures. Further, a debtor may challenge the amount of debt after a sale by filing exceptions to the court auditor’s determination of the debt due.
However, the Court of Appeals held that, once the sale occurs, the debtor no longer has a right to redeem the property. Therefore, the appeals court directed the trial court to ratify the Condominium’s second foreclosure sale.
Back to LawLetter Menu